Showing posts with label erratology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label erratology. Show all posts

Friday, July 3, 2009

Friedrich Schiller, "Kassandra/Cassandra" (1802)

Nur das Irrthum ist das Leben,
Und das Wissen ist der Tot
.

Error is life [life is error], and knowledge is death.

Wer erfreute sich des Lebens,
Der in seine Tiefen blickt!

Who can enjoy life who sees into its depths!


Friedrich Schiller, The Poems of Schiller, Complete: Including All his Early Suppressed Pieces, trans. Edgar Alfred Bowring (John W. Parker, 1851) 153-57.

Thursday, July 2, 2009

The Philosophy of "As If," a.k.a. fictionalism: another erratological method

Hans Vaihinger [1852-1933], The Philosophy of "As If" [Philosophie des Als Ob]: A System of Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind, 2nd ed., trans. C. K. Ogden (1911 [wr. 1880s], 1924/1935; Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968).

From wikipedia [ed.]: In Philosophie des Als Ob, [Vaihinger] argue[s] that human beings can never really know the underlying reality of the world, and that as a result we construct systems of thought and then assume that these match reality: we behave "as if" the world matches our models. In the preface to the English edition of his work, Vaihinger expresses his principle of Fictionalism: "an idea whose theoretical untruth or incorrectness, and therewith its falsity, is admitted, is not for that reason practically valueless and useless; for such an idea, in spite of its theoretical nullity, may have great practical importance."

Vaihinger's summary of the Philosophy of "As If" in the autobiographical chapter that begins the English edition (xlv-xlvii):
  1. A dichotomy exists between science, which concerns itself with matter in motion, and philosophy, which concerns itself with sensations (this antinomy cannot be mediated by reason, only through intuition and experience).
  2. The "striving" or struggle for existence that exists in all matter has evolved into will (the will to live and to dominate others) in human beings.
  3. Consciousness/thought is a means to the end of, i.e., serves, the struggle for existence, in other words, the will; thus, consciousness/thought is biological.
  4. Such a means tends to develop in excess of its end—and can emancipate itself to become an end-in-itself;
  5. thus thought can become theoretical (thought about thought) . . .
  6. . . . and set itself impossible problems (like trying to solve the antimony of mind and matter).
  7. Such problems can only be solved "by looking backwards, by showing how they arose psychologically within us," i.e. by finding their biological conditions of possibility.
  8. Therefore, this philosophy is "anti-rational or irrationalist," i.e. not grounded in reason: i.e. . . .
  9. . . . thought is biological, and . . .
  10. many thought-processes/-constructs are "consciously false assumptions [as-ifs or fictions], which either contradict reality or are even contradictory in themselves, but which are intentionally thus formed in order to overcome difficulties of thought by this artificial deviation and reach the goal of thought by roundabout ways and by-paths."
  11. This "un-real" as-if world is as important as the "real" world—in fact, more important in ethical and aesthetic matters.
  12. Our given reality is our sensations.
  13. Science deals with the regularities of this reality[; philosophy with the irregularities (?)].
  14. Much in this reality is fitting [regular], but much is not—but though some of us console ourselves with the fiction that there is a Higher Spirit that created or regulates the universe . . .
  15. . . . it is senseless [i.e. irrational] to question the meaning of the universe
He prefaces this list by saying, as 1. suggests, "We do not understand the world when we are pondering over its problems, but when we are doing the world's work" (xlv). To do this, we must often make do with "as ifs," "consciously false ideas," which he equates with Kant's appearances. A "[f]iction is . . . merely a more conscious, more practical and more fruitful error" (94).

Note:
  1. a fiction: an assumption known to be false—but useful [a heuristic: "a part of that ars inveniendi which, in former times, was usually appended to Logic" (105)]
  2. a hypothesis: an assumption that is probable [a provisional idea requiring experiment or evaluation]
The four characteristics of fictions:
  1. an "arbitrary deviation from reality, that is, . . . contradiction of it"—and, ultimately, self-contradiction (97), which means that . . .
  2. they "disappear in the course of history [through experience] or through the operation of logic [through thought]" (98),
  3. they are known to be fictional: "the fiction is just a fiction" (ibid.), and . . .
  4. . . . expedient: "means to a definite end" (99).
Thus, "truth . . . is merely the most expedient error" (emphasis given; 108; see Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense").

Categories of fiction:
  1. artificial classification: dichotomy, the Linnaean system
  2. abstractive (neglective, i.e. reductive) fictions: models, e.g. Adam Smith's assumption that human beings are egoistic, the analogy of psychic phenomena with mechanical processes, etc., linguistic roots, a mean or average (human being), approximation, the Socratic method
  3. a. schematic fictions, e.g. the simple (isolated) case, b. paradigmatic fictions or imaginary cases, c. utopian fictions, incl. the state of nature, d. the (arche)type
  4. tropic or symbolic (analogical) fictions, cf. the myth or poetic simile, esp. in physics, metaphysics and theology, e.g. substance, categories, . . .
  5. juristic (legal) fictions, and . . .
  6. personificatory fictions: soul, energy, force
  7. summational fictions (often mnemonic), i.e. general ideas
  8. heuristic fictions
  9. practical (ethical) fictions: freedom, the (standpoint of the) ideal
  10. mathematical fictions: (empty) space, (empty) time, etc.
  11. abstract generalisation, including mathematical and physical fictions like . . .
  12. unjustified transference: zero cases, negative/imaginary/irrational numbers, fractions;
  13. infinity; [14] matter; [15] the atom, and other [16] physical fictions, as well as . . .
  14. metaphysical fictions [my term] like [17] the thing-in-itself and [18] the absolute (17-84)
Cf. C. K. Ogden, Bentham's Theory of Fictions (1932; Routledge, 2007)—see below; Alfred Adler, in Heinz and Rowena R. Ansbacher, The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler (Harper, 1956) on the personality construct of a fictional final goal; Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction (OUP, 1967) on Vaihinger as a methodologist of narrativity; James Hillman, Healing Fiction (Continuum, 1994), which identifies the tendency to literalize, rather than "see through our meanings," with neurosis and madness (110[-12]). See also Barry Stampfel, Hans Vaihinger's Ghostly Presence in Contemporary Literary Studies," Criticism (Summer 1998).

Tuesday, June 23, 2009

Fumblerules

Fumblerules are writing rules that contradict their advice, such as "don't use no double negatives" and "eschew obfuscation" (they are thus self-referential paradoxes).

See
The alt.usage.english FAQ, quoting George L. Trigg, "Grammar," Physics Review Letters 42.12 (19 Mar 1979) 747-48 and William Safire, "The Fumblerules of Grammar," New York Times (11 Apr. 1979): SM4.

Here are some of Trigg's:
  1. Make sure each pronoun agrees with their antecedent.
  2. Just between you and I, the case of pronoun is important.
  3. Watch out for irregular verbs which have crope into English.
  4. Verbs has to agree in number with their subjects.
  5. Don't use no double negatives.
  6. Being bad grammar, a writer should not use dangling modifiers.
  7. Join clauses good like a conjunction should.
  8. A writer must be not shift your point of view.
  9. About sentence fragments.
  10. Don't use run-on sentences you got to punctuate them.
  11. In letters essays and reports use commas to separate items in series.
  12. Don't use commas, which are not necessary.
  13. Parenthetical words however should be enclosed in commas.
  14. Its important to use apostrophes right in everybodys writing.
  15. Don't abbrev.
  16. Check to see if you any words out.
  17. In the case of a report, check to see that jargonwise, it's A-OK.
  18. As far as incomplete constructions, they are wrong.
  19. About repetition, the repetition of a word might be real effective repetition - take, for instance the repetition of Abraham Lincoln.
  20. In my opinion, I think that an author when he is writing should definitely not get into the habit of making use of too many unnecessary words that he does not really need in order to put his message across.
  21. Use parallel construction not only to be concise but also clarify.
  22. It behooves us all to avoid archaic expressions.
  23. Mixed metaphors are a pain in the neck and ought to be weeded out.
  24. Consult the dictionery to avoid mispelings.
  25. To ignorantly split an infinitive is a practice to religiously avoid.
  26. Last but not least, lay off cliches.
Erratology encourages students to make (and teach) their own fumblerules to break (and learn) the disabling rules of the institution. By thus risking the authority they are lent by the institution, they exercise their sovereign right to write.

erratology: Erratology uses as a heuristic the principle that rules exist to be broken/that exceptions disprove the rule (against Cicero's exceptio probat regulam in casibus non exceptis in his defence of Balbo [56BCE]); through erratology you can learn by making mistakes rather than proceeding by trial and error - or learning from your mistakes. It is a variant on Winston Weathers' deformative grammar, "Grammar B" (see Peter Elbow's essay, "Collage: Your Cheatin' Art").

And the same goes for writing teachers: they too must risk mistakes—and their authority . . .

Cf. Muphry's (or Merphy's) Law:
"In neither taste nor precision is any man's practice a court of last appeal, for writers all, both great and small, are habitual sinners against the light; and their accuser is cheerfully aware that his own work will supply (as in making this book it has supplied) many 'awful examples'" (Ambrose Bierce, "Write it Right: A Little Blacklist of Literary Faults" [1909]).

The law, as set out by John Bangsund, states that:

  1. if you write anything criticizing editing or proofreading, there will be a fault of some kind in what you have written;
  2. if an author thanks you in a book for your editing or proofreading, there will be mistakes in the book;
  3. the stronger the sentiment expressed in (a) and (b), the greater the fault;
  4. any book devoted to editing or style will be internally inconsistent.
("Scenes of Editorial Life: Muphry's Law," John Bangsund's Threepenny Planet [Mar 1992])

Sunday, June 21, 2009

Reflecting on the Craft of Writing

Excerpts from Richard Sennett on the craftsman in us all in "Labours of Love" (see The Craftsman [Yale, 2008]—and Kalefa Sanneh on the return of craft, i.e. slow thinking/learning):

The "end" [telos] of craft is engagement [flow] . . .

The carpenter, lab technician, and conductor are all craftsmen because they are dedicated to good work for its own sake. Theirs is practical activity, but their labour is not simply a means to another end. . . . It's certainly possible to get by in life without dedication, but the craftsman exemplifies the special human condition of being engaged. [. . .]

It requires deep thinking, i.e. problematising and reflexivity . . .
All craftsmanship is founded on skill developed to a high degree. By one commonly used measure, about 10,000 hours of experience are required to produce a master carpenter or musician. As skill progresses, it becomes more problem-attuned, such as the lab technician worrying about procedure—whereas people with primitive levels of skill struggle just to get things to work. At its higher reaches, technique is no longer a mechanical activity; people can feel fully and think deeply about what they are doing, once they do it well. [. . .]

One learns a craft by making mistakes on purpose (i.e. the path to truth goes by error ["erratology" or, strictly, hamartology]) . . .
[T]he principle of reasoning backwards, from effects to causes, underlies all good craftsmanship. . . . Sometimes, in discussions of education, this recognition is reduced to the cliché of "learning from one's mistakes." Musical technique shows that the matter is not so simple. I have to be willing to make errors, to play wrong notes, in order to get them right eventually. This is the commitment to truthfulness. . . .

Thus, learning a craft requires "dwell[ing] in waste" [argos] . . .
This musical quest addresses one of the shibboleths in craftsmanship: the ideal of "fit-for-purpose." In tools, as in technique, the good craftsman is supposed to eliminate all procedures that do not serve a predetermined end. The ideal of fit-for-purpose has dominated thinking in the industrial era. Diderot's Encyclopedia in the 18th century celebrated an ideal paper-making factory at L'Anglée, in which there was no mess or wasted paper [!]. Today, programmers similarly dream of systems without "dead ends." But the ideal of fit-for-purpose can work against experiment in developing a tool or a skill. . . [A] craftsman . . . has instead to dwell in waste, following up dead ends. In technology, as in art, the probing craftsman does more than encounter problems; he or she creates them in order to know them. Improving one's technique is never a routine, mechanical process.

And the path to/of craft is roundabout [and aggregrative] (not direct [and cumulative]), i.e. "arduous and erratic" . . .
To develop skill requires a good measure of experiment and questioning; mechanical practice seldom enables people to improve their skills. Too often we imagine good work itself as success built, economically and efficiently, upon success. Developing skill is more arduous and erratic than this.

Craft involves three key dispositions: "to localise [concretise], to question [qualify] and to open up [contextualise and evaluate]" . . .
Three abilities are the foundation of craftsmanship: to localise, to question and to open up. The first involves making a matter concrete; the second, reflecting on its qualities; the third, expanding its sense. The carpenter establishes the peculiar grain of a single piece of wood, looking for detail; turns the wood over and over, pondering how the pattern on the surface might reflect the structure hidden underneath; decides that the grain can be brought out if he or she uses a metal solvent rather than standard wood varnish. [And it is "synaesthetic"—or, to extrapolate) embodied and embedded . . .] To deploy these capabilities the brain needs to process visual, aural, tactile and language-symbol information simultaneously.